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Abstract Simple heuristics can be efficient ways of decision making and literature
has shown that they are widely used in actual decision situations. Although many
types of heuristics have been found and analyzed, there is only scarce research on
factors that lead to the use of a particular heuristic. In the present paper, we describe
an experiment to analyze whether the usage of a particular heuristic like recognition
or take-the-best depends on individual decision making styles as identified by Scott
and Bruce (Educ Psychol Meas 55(5):818–831, 1995). The experiment is based on a
choice problem, in which different heuristics are likely to lead to different choices.
Analyzing experimental data from two replications of the experiment in two dif-
ferent countries, we find some evidence that decision making styles influence the
use of heuristics. However, considerable differences between the two experiments
indicate that other, perhaps cultural, factors might also be important.
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1 Introduction
In many everyday decisions, for example purchasing situations, economic actors
often rely on simple heuristics rather than on elaborate calculations (Hauser 2011).
In the course of the last decades, literature has identified many different types of
heuristics that could be applied in such simple decision situations, like the
recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 2011) or the take-the-best heuristic
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Newell et al. 2003). To better understand the
behavior of economic actors, it thus becomes crucial to find out which heuristic is
used under which circumstances. However, empirical literature on heuristics so far
has mainly focused on establishing the precise characteristics of each heuristic, e.g.
if decision makers really rely on just one single clue (Pohl 2006), or whether clues
are used in a compensatory or noncompensatory manner (Pachur et al. 2008).
Although this research has significantly contributed to our understanding of how
these heuristics actually work, the factors that trigger the use of a particular heuristic
have only been scarcely studied in literature to date.
A person makes a decision (and possibly uses a heuristic for decision making) in
a certain situation. The use of a heuristic could thus be triggered both by situational
factors such as task and context (Payne et al. 1993), and by personal factors. Some
situational factors that were studied in the literature include time pressure (Hilbig
et al. 2012) or the way in which information on the problem is presented (Bro¨der
and Schiffer 2006). Personal factors include intelligence (Bro¨der 2003) and some of
the Big Five personality factors, in particular neuroticism (Hilbig 2008).
Empirical literature on decision making has not only identified different
heuristics that one might use in making decisions, but has also developed
classifications of decision making styles, which characterize the different ways of
how people approach decision problems. Scott and Bruce (1995) developed a five-
dimensional instrument for measuring decision making styles, in which they
distinguish between rational, intuitive, spontaneous, dependent and avoidant styles.
Although the relationship between those styles and the use of heuristics for decision
making seems intuitively plausible, it has to the best of our knowledge not been
studied before.
The main aim of this paper is, therefore, to study the relationship between
decision making styles and the use of different heuristics. Previous research has
already shown that time pressure is an important factor in triggering the use of
decision making heuristics. We therefore employ this factor in order to create a
situation in which decision makers are more likely to rely on heuristics, and then
study the type of heuristics subjects with different decision making styles employ in
this situation.
Our approach differs from previous research on heuristics in decision making in
that we study the choice of one out of several heuristics, and thus consider several
heuristics in parallel. We therefore create a situation in which decision makers need
to select among several alternatives, and subjects following a particular heuristic
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will likely choose a particular alternative. In line with current literature, this choice
is framed as an everyday choice situation, in which the use of heuristics is likely to
occur, rather than an important decision that would trigger elaborate cognitive
processes. We furthermore use time pressure as an experimental factor in order to
compare a situation in which the use of heuristics is likely to happen as opposed to a
situation in which subjects might rely more on cognition. Finally, in order to test the
stability of our results, we conducted two identical experiments in different
countries (Austria and Spain) having quite different cultures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2, we review the
literature on the use of heuristics and on decision making styles in order to
formulate our research questions on the possible relationships between them.
Section 3 describes the experiments which we performed and in Sect. 4 the results
are presented. Those results are further discussed in Sect. 5, which concludes the
paper.
2 Literature review and research questions
The main aim of this paper is to find factors that will trigger the use of some
particular heuristics in a (consumer) choice situation. We therefore briefly review
the empirical literature on heuristics and on possible factors influencing the use of
those heuristics, before we finally proceed to formulate our research questions.
2.1 Heuristics
In a world of limited knowledge, resources, and time, the concept of rational
decision making is not always a suitable model to describe and explain human
behavior. Research indicates that individuals, due to a lack of time and commitment,
tend to rely on shortcuts when making decisions (Payne et al. 1993). As a
consequence, the concept of fast and frugal heuristics has gained attention as an
important concept to describe human judgments (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). The term
heuristic stems from Greek, meaning to find, and it is used in cognitive psychology
as a ‘‘useful shortcut, an approximation, or a rule of thumb for searching through a
space of possible solutions’’ (Hoffrage and Reimer 2004, p. 439).
The literature on fast and frugal heuristics pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. (1999)
has identified several different types of heuristics that can be used in decision
processes. In this paper, we particularly focus on two heuristics from the ‘‘adaptive
toolbox’’ proposed by Gigerenzer et al. (1999), which are widely discussed in
literature and which can be seen as particularly closely related to consumer decision
making (Hauser 2014, p.1692), the recognition heuristic and the take-the-best
heuristic. The recognition heuristic has been related to consumer choices in several
empirical studies (Marewski et al. 2010; Hauser 2011; Thoma and Williams 2013;
Hilbig 2014). Take-the-best is among the most studied heuristics, and since it refers
to potentially multiple attributes of alternatives, it is considered a plausible model of
boundedly rational decision making (Martignon and Hoffrage 2002). We experi-
mentally study the use of those heuristics in comparison to a more rational, but also
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cognitively more demanding decision process, as well as an affective decision
process guided by emotions.
The recognition heuristic as an efficient rule of thumb can be described as a
frugal inference strategy relying on only one piece of information, namely the
recognition cue (Hilbig and Pohl 2008), and ignoring other information (Hilbig
2014). According to Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011), if a decision maker has to
make a choice between two objects and recognizes one of them, he or she infers that
the recognized object has the higher value on a given criterion and thus will prefer it
over the unrecognized object. Empirical evidence demonstrates that this one-cue
non-compensatory heuristic can be surprisingly accurate (Hilbig 2014), resulting in
a remarkably high number of correct inferences by individuals (Borges et al. 1999)
and in better predictions regarding consumer behavior than compensatory models
(Marewski et al. 2010). Relying on recognition can be useful, particularly
considering the fact that recognition lasts long and is easily accessible. While it
is not limited to the case of just two alternatives, its application is limited to
problems involving only a small number of alternatives (Marewski et al. 2010), and
some experiments have shown that alternative compensatory models account better
for aggregate data patterns (Hilbig 2014). The recognition heuristic has been widely
studied, but has received only mixed support in literature on probabilistic
inferences. However, very few studies focus on the application of the recognition
heuristic in preferential decision situations such as consumer choice (Hilbig 2014).
Marewski et al. (2010) propose that recognition is used to form consideration sets of
alternatives, so that unrecognized alternatives are ranked behind recognized
alternatives.
The take-the-best heuristic takes into account that decision makers might possess
several clues about the objects they have to decide on, but it proposes that decision
makers use only one single cue in the decision making process. For example, when
estimating the size of a city, such cues could be whether the city has an airport, an
opera house, etc. (Reimer and Rieskamp 2007). Decision makers then would assume
that the city that has such a facility (while the others do not) is also larger. The take-
the-best heuristic tries cues in order of validity, one after the other, and stops at the
first cue that discriminates between the objects under consideration (Gigerenzer
et al. 1999). Take-the-best is considered to be a fast heuristic due to the fact that it
does not require complicated computations and it is frugal because the stopping rule
limits the search for cues, sometimes even to just one cue.
Fast and frugal heuristics like recognition or take-the-best still resemble rational
theories of decision making in that they apply (although only limited) information
on the available alternatives to evaluate the alternatives and ultimately make a
choice. Depending on the heuristic, information can be processed in a compensatory
or non-compensatory manner. However, humans sometimes approach decision
problems also in a very different way and rely on emotions in decision making.
Gigerenzer (2001, p. 6–7) points out that ‘‘theories of decision making have often
neglected emotions, and sometimes even cast them as the very opposite of
rationality.’’ Nevertheless, emotions are a crucial factor when being engaged in
decisions and can support the process of decision making (Gigerenzer 2001). In this
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context, emotions can be classified as behavioral theories and are sometimes also
referred to as affect heuristic (Slovic et al. 2007).
2.2 Factors influencing the use of heuristics
Empirical literature has shown that heuristics are not universally used: they are used
only by a fraction of subjects, and only in certain situations. For example, Newell
et al. (2003) found that roughly one third of subjects were actually using take-the-
best. Similarly, in the experiments of Bro¨der (2000) and Bro¨der and Schiffer (2006),
between 28 and 53 % of the subjects were classified as using take-the-best. Other
studies found even lower numbers, for example Glo¨ckner and Bro¨der (2011) found
that less than 10 % of their subjects used recognition, and only about 15 % used
take-the-best. Concerning the recognition heuristic, Pachur et al. (2008) found that
about half of their subjects used recognition in a strict sense (without incorporating
additional information).
This limited extent of actual use of heuristics has led researchers to study factors
that could influence the application of heuristics. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011)
thus noted that decision makers seem to apply different decision strategies, but little
is known about the factors that influence their choice. One framework to explain the
choice of different approaches to decision making is the effort-accuracy framework
by Payne et al. (1993). According to this framework, a decision making strategy is
selected by considering the trade-off between the cognitive effort needed to make a
decision, and the quality of the decision, since methods leading to better decisions
typically also require higher effort. However, since the fast and frugal heuristics we
consider here are all characterized by very little cognitive effort, this framework
cannot be applied to the choice between these heuristics.
Two types of factors can be distinguished: factors that refer to individual
characteristics of the decision maker, and factors related to the decision problem or
the environment. Research on individual factors has indicated that intelligence
moderates the choice of decision strategies such as heuristics (Bro¨der 2003).
Researchers also studied the impact of the Big Five personality characteristics on
the use of heuristics and found that persons high in neuroticism are more likely to
use the recognition heuristic (Hilbig 2008). Furthermore, additional knowledge
(beyond recognition) a decision maker has about alternatives has some impact on
choices (Pohl 2006), although its impact seems to be limited (Hilbig et al. 2009).
The type of environment in which a decision is made has also an impact on the
decision making strategy (Bro¨der 2003). In particular, a high amount of uncertainty
present in the environment seems to increase reliance on heuristics like take-the-best
(Hogarth and Karelaia 2006; Newell et al. 2003). The choice of strategies also
depends on the availability of additional cues, their validity and the cost at which
such information can be obtained. If the validity of the primary cue is high, take-the-
best is more often used (Newell et al. 2003), while higher validity of other cues
reduces its usage (Newell and Fernandez 2006). Some authors also report that the
cost of additional information increases the use of heuristics (Newell et al. 2003),
while others report that choices can still be better explained by alternative models
even if information acquisition has high costs (Ayal and Hochman 2009).
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Another important factor that influences the use of heuristics is time pressure. A
positive effect of time pressure on the use of the recognition heuristic was found by
Pachur and Hertwig (2006). Furthermore, Hilbig et al. (2012) found that time
pressure increases reliance on the recognition heuristic even when violating time
constraints does not have a negative impact on the decision maker. It thus seems that
the mere presence of time pressure has a strong effect on the choice of a decision
strategy. Time pressure was also used as an experimental factor to induce heuristic
choice behavior in consumer decision experiments, like for example Langner and
Krengel (2013).
Since the presence or absence of time pressure is likely to induce different levels
of use of heuristics for the same decision problem, we employ it as an experimental
factor in the subsequent empirical study to trigger the use of heuristics in decision
making.
2.3 Decision making styles
In contrast to factors related to the choice problem, research on individual factors
that might trigger the use of heuristics is so far limited. However, decision making
behavior in general has been studied more intensively, and different classifications
of decision making styles can be found in the literature. Many of them refer to
specific settings like shopping situations (Sproles and Kendall 1986). For this paper,
we use a more general classification of decision making styles developed by Scott
and Bruce (1995). They distinguish five dimensions of a decision making style:
– Rational: This style is characterized by making decisions in a logical and
systematic way, or considering various options in terms of a specific goal.
– Intuitive: This style is characterized by relying on intuition and making
decisions that ‘‘feel right’’.
– Dependent: This style represents decision makers who tend to consult others
before making a decision, and who rely on the assistance and support of others.
– Avoiding: This style is characterized as putting off decisions or making
decisions only at the last minute.
– Spontaneous: This style refers to making quick and impulsive decisions.
These five styles represent different dimensions of a decision making process. The
instrument of Scott and Bruce (1995) does not classify decision makers uniquely
into one style, but assigns each decision maker a score in each dimension indicating
how much that decision maker’s individual style resembles each of the five
prototypical styles.
The instrument developed by Scott and Bruce (1995) has been extensively used
in studies on decision making behavior. Among them, and in direct relation with the
present paper, Crossley and Highhouse (2005) used a variant of the instrument to
classify different approaches applicants use in searching for jobs. Curseu and
Schruijer (2012) studied the relationship of decision making styles to actual decision
performance and found that subjects scoring high in the rational dimension were
less affected by decision biases, and subjects scoring high on the avoiding style
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were more indecisive. Similarly, de Bruin et al. (2007) found a positive relationship
between rational decision making style and decision competence. Gettinger et al.
(2013) used the instrument to classify users of a decision support system and their
preferences for different graphical information representations.
Although many of the items used in the instrument by Scott and Bruce (1995)
describe decision making behavior that either reflects the use of heuristics (e.g.,
‘‘When making decisions, I rely on my instincts’’, item I1 for the intuitive style), or
reflect the avoidance of heuristics (e.g., ‘‘My decision making requires careful
thought’’, item R3 of the rational style), to the best of our knowledge the
relationship between decision making styles and the use of fast and frugal heuristics
has not been studied before. We therefore in the next subsection formulate research
questions to explore this relationship. There we also consider time pressure as a
problem characteristic that can trigger the use of heuristics in general.
2.4 Research questions
The relationship between time pressure and the use of heuristics has been previously
studied in literature (Hilbig et al. 2012), but for the sake of completeness, we still
formulate it as a research question:
RQ1: Does time pressure increase the use of heuristics in comparison to a
rational choice?
Bro¨der and Schiffer (2006) test the effects of the presence of verbal information
on the use of several compensatory (Franklin’s Rule, Dawes’s Rule) and one non-
compensatory (take-the-best) heuristic. They find that cognitive load enhances the
usage of take-the-best irrespective of the stimulus format. As take-the-best may be
considered the easiest way to reach a decision that is at least partly rational, we
expect rational decision makers to switch from a thorough analysis of the problem to
a take-the-best heuristic under time pressure.
RQ2: Do decision makers who score high on the rational dimension apply the
take-the-best heuristic rather than other heuristics when they are under time
pressure?
Marketing scholars suggest that recognition based decision rules are particularly
applicable for purchase decisions regarding frequently purchased product categories
(Hauser 2011). Recognition based decision rules can be considered a comparatively
easy way to reach a decision, and do not require acquisition of further information
on product attributes. Since avoidant decision makers tend to postpone decisions, it
is reasonable to assume that they will also try to circumvent the initial pre-decision
step of acquiring additional information. Therefore, it can be assumed that avoidant
decision makers will make more use of the recognition heuristic than decision
makers who score low on the avoidance dimension, and that this relationship will
hold both under time pressure and without time pressure. The same might hold for
dependent decision makers, since well-known products are also those products
which are bought by many other consumers.
RQ3: Is there a positive relationship between avoidant and/or dependent style and
the use of the recognition heuristic?
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Spontaneous decision makers tend to make fast and spontanous decisions, but do
not necessarily rely as much on intuition and gut feeling as intuitive decision
makers. Thus, they will likely use an approach that is based on some, but only
limited information about the alternatives. Their decision making behavior will
therefore more likely match the take-the-best heuristic, which bases a decision on
factual information about one attribute, rather than, for example, the recognition
heuristic, which does not directly consider any attribute of the decision alternative.
We also consider it unlikely that spontaneous decision makers will engage in the
heavy cognitive processing required to find an objectively best alternative.
RQ4: Is there a positive relationship between the spontaneous style and the use of
the take-the-best heuristic?
3 Experiment
In order to study the relationship between decision making styles and the use of
different heuristics, we performed an experiment in two different countries focusing
on the use of selected fast and frugal heuristics in everyday purchase decisions for
food products. Participants in a computer-based experiment were asked to choose
among five different alternatives of an everyday food product. For this purpose, we
selected eggs as a product category as they are known, consumed and purchased on
a regular basis by the majority of consumers. On the other hand, consumers might
be more involved in egg purchase decisions than in purchase decisions for other
comparable everyday foodstuffs due to the extremely intensive systems of
production for regular eggs and the growing concern about animal welfare (Mesı´as
et al. 2011).
Employing an experimental between-subjects design, we used presence or
absence of time pressure as the manipulated factor. The same choice task was
presented in both conditions. Subjects had to make a choice between five types of
eggs packaged in different cartons (Fig. 1). Each of the five different stimuli
targeted a specific heuristic (or no heuristic). Specifically, two stimuli targeted the
take-the-best heuristic and the recognition heuristic, respectively, one was designed
to trigger an emotional response, one required high cognitive processing, and the
fifth stimulus was a filler product which was not targeted at any specific behavior.
The presentation order of the five stimuli within the questionnaire was randomized,
ensuring a counterbalanced presentation of all the stimuli.
In the online experiment, participants were asked to put themselves in a situation
of purchasing eggs and were requested to choose one option among five different
offers. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the time pressure condition or
the condition without time pressure. In the condition without time pressure,
respondents were not restricted to a time limit while in the former condition,
participants were informed that they had to decide on a product within forty seconds
calculated from the moment of proceeding to the stimulus material. Comparable
time horizons can be found in the literature. Langner and Krengel (2013) applied a
time pressure condition of ninety seconds for selecting a cell phone, which is a
considerably more complex product, to decrease the amount of cognitive processing
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in decision making. The time interval of forty seconds used in the present study was
based on a pretest indicating that forty seconds are a sufficiently long time interval
to get a rough impression of all products and choose one offer, however, not long
Price: only 2.99 Euro
Raising: free-range
Quality Grade: A
Country of Origin: Austria
Shelf Life: 2 weeks
Quantity: 6 eggs
“Take-the-best” stimulus
Price: 3.19 Euro
Raising: free-range
Quality Grade: A
Country of Origin: Austria
Shelf Life: 2 weeks
Quantity: 6 eggs
“Recognition” stimulus
Price: 3.19 Euro
Raising: free-range
Quality Grade: A
Country of Origin: Austria
Shelf Life: 2 weeks
Quantity: 6 eggs
“Emotional” stimulus
Price: 3.10 Euro
Raising: free-range, with additional infor-
mation on raising of chicken
Quality Grade: A/extra large
Country of Origin: Austria, of guaranteed
origin
Shelf Life: 2 weeks
Quantity: 6 eggs
Additional information: GM-free,
salmonella-free, animal rights tested,
free of toxins, hygiene programme
“Cognitive” stimulus
Price: 3.19 Euro
Raising: barn/deep litter
Quality Grade: B
Country of Origin: Austria
Shelf Life: 2 weeks
Quantity: 6 eggs
“Filler” stimulus
Fig. 1 Stimulus material for Austria (in Spain, Country of Origin was indicated as Spain)
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enough to screen the offers in more detail. Results from the pretest show that even in
the non-time pressure condition less than ninety seconds are used to decide on a
product.
After deciding on a specific product, respondents were requested to state the
reasons for their decision in an open-ended question followed by a set of questions
on their buying behavior (buying rate, usage rate) with respect to the product
category of interest, their attitude to and liking of this product category and a
translated version of the decision making style instrument by Scott and Bruce
(1995) as shown in the ‘‘Appendix’’. Demographic information was collected at the
end of questionnaire.
Stimuli for each heuristic condition consisted of an image of an appropriately
designed egg carton of a fictitious brand as well as a short product description,
presented in the same manner and design for all products and always incorporating
information on price, the raising of chicken, quality grade, country of origin, shelf
life and the quantity of eggs in the carton. The product description of the cognitive
complex stimulus contained additional information beyond the mentioned points,
which was not present for the other stimuli. Figure 1 shows the images presented to
subjects as well as the information provided with each stimulus.
Images as well as product descriptions differ only with respect to the characteristics
essential for the particular heuristic condition. Generally, all egg cartons were
visualized in a novel and innovative shape, except for the stimulus targeted at the
recognition heuristic, where a familiar shape was presented. The product targeted at
the take-the-best heuristic was offered for a special price, which was prominently
displayed on the package for easy retrieval. In the emotional condition, a picture of a
cartoon chicken was added to stimulate emotional bonding with the product. On the
product package of the cognitive complex condition, additional seals of quality and
further information were visualized. The filler product was offered at a lower quality
compared to the rest of the stimuli. In order to ensure a professional design of the
cartons, all images were created by a graphic designer.
A manipulation check (n = 30) was conducted to test the stimulus material with
regard to overall attitudes, pleasantness, stimulus concreteness, informative value
and complexity of the stimuli. Cartons with low evaluations with regard to overall
attitudes and pleasantness were removed from the set. In addition, also the
questionnaire was carefully pre-tested to check for possible problems with statement
clarity and respondent understanding of how to complete the task. No problems
were detected in this pretest.
We employed well established scales for measurement. For the measurement of
decision making styles we used the 25-item scale by Scott and Bruce (1995) as
adapted to the German language by Gettinger et al. (2013). For the second
experiment, the items were translated into Spanish and a native speaker conducted a
backward-translation. Both translations are shown in the ‘‘Appendix’’. All 25 items
were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale.
Attitudes towards the product category of interest were assessed by three
semantic differential items (Kempf and Laczniak 2001), while for the assessment of
liking we used a seven-point rating scale (Ares and Deliza 2010) reaching from 1
(dislike very much) to 7 (like very much).
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3.1 Sample composition
We conducted two identical experiments, one in Vienna, Austria, in May 2014, and
the other one in Madrid, Spain, in October 2014. Students and staff from the Faculty
of Business, Economics and Statistics of the University of Vienna (Austria) and
from the Economics and Business School of the Complutense University of Madrid
(Spain) were asked to voluntarily participate in the study as well as spread the
questionnaire link among their family and friends in order to get a wider sample.
The Austrian sample consisted of 178 respondents, thereof 63 % females.
Participants’ age ranged from 13 to 69 years with an average of 28 years. The
sample contained 48.9 % persons in education, 33.7 % white-collar workers and
employees working in public institutions, 3.9 % blue-collar workers, 5.6 % self-
employed, 0.6 % retirees and 7.3 % unemployed. Participants were recruited for the
experiment via two channels. On the one hand, respondents were recruited through
social media platforms and e-mail, on the other hand, students participated in
exchange for course credits.
An average of 5.57 for product liking can be reported on a seven point scale. The
81 respondents who were randomly assigned to the time-pressure condition, spent
on average 36.57 s on the respective page. In contrast, the 97 respondents in the
non-time pressure condition spent on average 75.05 s. With respect to the frequency
of product purchase, almost 40 % of respondents purchase eggs a number of times
per month. Approximately 30 % specified a purchasing frequency of once a week,
followed by 12 % of respondents, who purchase the respective product only once a
month. Almost 8 % of participants buy egg cartons less than once a month, 4.5 %
several times a week and 3.4 % never. Respondents were also asked to indicate the
frequency of their product consumption. The majority of participants (36 %)
consume eggs several times a week, followed by 28.1 %, who indicated to consume
eggs once a week. 24.2 % of participants specified a consumption frequency of a
number of times per month.
A total of 142 Spanish respondents participated in the replication of the
experiment, consisting of 51 % females and 49 % males. With an average of
27 years, respondents’ age ranged from 19 to 71. In terms of occupation, the
majority of the respondents were in education (73.9 %), followed by 16.6 % white-
collar workers and employees working in public institutions, 2.6 % blue-collar
workers, 2.6 % self-employed respondents, 1.3 % retirees and a minority of
unemployed participants. Product liking, with an average of 5.83, is very similar to
Austria.
The Spanish sample, similarly to the Austrian one, spent on average more time
on the respective questionnaire in the condition without time pressure. Overall, 84
respondents were assigned to the condition without time pressure and 73 with time
pressure. The majority of the Spanish respondents (46.5 %) purchase eggs once a
week, 28.03 % a few times per month, and approximately 10 % once a month.
Frequent egg purchasers (daily, a few times per week) and respondents who
purchase eggs less than once a month or never constitute a minority. When
comparing the egg consumption of Spain with Austria, it can be argued that Spanish
respondents consume (and purchase) more eggs. Almost 60 % of the Spanish
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respondents consume eggs several times per week, approximately 20 % once a
week and 15 % a few times per month. A v2 test indicates that differences in egg
consumption between the two countries are significant at p\0.1 %, and differences
in purchase behavior are significant at p\ 5 %.
Since most groups except students and white-collar workers were only weakly
represented in the sample, we decided to drop those groups altogether to obtain a
more homogeneous sample. Furthermore, we dropped respondents who obviously
were just clicking through the online questionnaire and thus we eliminated all
respondents who had answered 7 to all four questions about attitude, and to more
than ten questions of the decision style questionnaire. The resulting reduced samples
were used for all further analyses. For the experiments in Austria, the reduced
sample consisted of 143 respondents, 92 (64.3 %) of which were female and 51
(35.7 %) were male. The final sample from the experiment in Spain consisted of 128
respondents, out of which 66 (51.6 %) were female and 42 (48.4 %) were male.
4 Results
4.1 Scales
Since we had to translate items for the decision making styles into German and
Spanish, respectively, we first performed an exploratory factor analysis to analyze
the factor structure of responses. Because decision making styles are not necessarily
orthogonal, we used an oblimin rotation for this analysis.
Table 1 shows the factor loadings for data obtained in Vienna. For clarity, this
table not only shows the factor loadings exceeding the usual threshold of 0.4, but in
parentheses also factor loadings exceeding 0.3. Most items load as expected, only
two items had higher loadings on other factors than the expected ones. Item S5
‘‘When making decisions, I do what seems natural at the moment’’ loads onto the
factor associated with the intuitive style with a factor loading of 0.45 (above the 0.4
threshold), rather than the spontaneous style. However, it should be noted that also
in the original paper by Scott and Bruce (1995), the spontaneous style was added at
a later stage, and the item in question is somewhat ambiguous. Item D5 loaded on
the factor associated with the rational style with a factor loading of 0.35, which is
below the threshold. Its loading in the factor associated with the dependent style was
not much lower at 0.28.
Similar results were obtained for the data from Madrid (Table 2). Again, item S5
does not exhibit a high loading on the factor corresponding to the spontaneous style,
but loads (at 0.37) onto the factor corresponding to the intuitive style. Item I4 did
not load on any factor with a loading of more than 0.3, its highest factor loading was
still on the factor associated with the intuitive style at 0.25. Given that these
deviations from the theoretical factor structure are quite small, we decided to retain
the original scale of Scott and Bruce (1995).
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4.2 Descriptive results
The distribution of scores in the decision making styles for the subjects in the two
experiments is shown in Fig. 2. The pattern of decision making styles is quite
similar across the two experiments. Subjects on average score rather high with
respect to the rational style, and low with respect to the avoiding and spontaneous
styles. In both experiments, the avoiding style also shows the highest variance.
Table 3 presents an overview of product choices in the entire sample.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of choices across the two experimental
conditions. In both experiments, applying time pressure led to a smaller number
of subjects choosing the ‘‘cognitive’’ product, and an increase in the share of the
products fitting the take-the-best and recognition heuristics. Under both experi-
mental conditions, subjects in Vienna selected the ‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘recognition’’
product more often than subjects in Madrid, and the ‘‘take-the-best’’ product less
often. The emotional and filler products were chosen only rarely in both
experiments, and the filler product only under time pressure.
Table 1 Factor loadings of
decision style items—Vienna
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
A1 0.71
A2 0.91
A3 0.88
A4 0.82
A5 0.77
D1 0.75
D2 0.61
D3 0.88
D4 0.80
D5 (0.35)
I1 0.60
I2 0.61
I3 (0.39) (0.36)
I4 0.63
I5 0.85
R1 0.54 (0.31)
R2 (0.38)
R3 0.69
R4 0.46 (0.35)
R5 0.58
S1 0.71
S2 0.83
S3 0.77
S4 0.55
S5 0.45 (0.34)
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Table 2 Factor loadings of
decision style items—Madrid
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
A1 0.62
A2 0.81
A3 0.80
A4 0.69
A5 0.77
D1 0.56
D2 0.55
D3 0.75
D4 0.85
D5 0.50
I1 0.81
I2 0.89
I3 0.35
I4
I5 0.66
R1 0.52
R2 0.79
R3 0.49
R4 0.50
R5 0.64
S1 0.49
S2 0.82
S3 0.41
S4 (0.36) 0.44
S5 (0.37)
Rational Intuitive Dependent Avoiding Spontaneous
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Decision styles − Madrid
Rational Intuitive Dependent Avoiding Spontaneous
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Decision styles − Vienna
Fig. 2 Distribution of decision making style scores for subjects in Madrid (left) and Vienna (right)
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4.3 Multiple correspondence analysis
In order to obtain a first impression of the relationships between time pressure,
decision making styles and the use of different heuristics, we performed a Multiple
Correspondence Analysis (MCA). This method is aimed specifically at quantifying
categorical data (Greenacre 2007), that is, assigning numerical scale values to the
response categories of several discrete variables, with certain optimal properties.
These scale values have been shown to have interesting geometric properties and
provide maps of the relationships between variables. The ultimate aim of MCA is to
produce a map of those relations in a similar way to principal components analysis,
in that the total variance of the variables is defined and then this total is decomposed
optimally along so-called ‘‘principal axes’’. The total variance in MCA is measured
by the so-called inertia, which is simply the usual Pearson chi-square statistic
calculated on the cross-tabulation, divided by the total sample size n. It is this inertia
which measures the degree of difference between the values of the variables that we
are trying to represent optimally in the eventual map. For mapping purposes, it is
usually hoped that a large percentage of the total inertia is accounted for by the first
Table 3 Product choices across the two experiments
Emotional Cognitive Filler Take the best Recognition Sum
Vienna 3 72 2 40 26 143
Vienna % 2.10 % 50.35 % 1.40 % 27.97 % 18.18 %
Madrid 5 50 2 56 15 128
Madrid % 3.91 % 39.06 % 1.56 % 43.75 % 11.72 %
Fig. 3 Distribution of choices among products for both experiments and treatments
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two principal axes, thereby allowing the relations to be visualized in two
dimensions.
The application of MCA on our data showed that the percentage of total inertia
explained by the first two dimensions is equal to 53.39 %. As 41.80 % is due to the
first axis, this is the more explicative dimension. A visualization of the results is
presented in Fig. 4. The first axis reveals an opposition between the two cities where
the experiment was undertaken (Madrid and Vienna) while the second axis, which
explains a lot less variability (11.60 % of the total inertia), specifies the time
pressure of the experiment. Therefore the horizontal direction in the map separates
respondents on the basis of the city. The vertical dimension differentiates
respondents on the basis of time constraint.
The proximity between levels of different nominal variables means that these
levels tend to appear together in the observations. Different colors have been used
for each of the variables to facilitate readability. So the top-right quadrant of the plot
clearly shows that the categories Time Pressure, White collar, Recognition and
Spontaneous are associated. In the case of the same nominal variable the proximity
between levels means that the groups of observations associated with these two
levels are themselves similar, but also that a variable discriminates better to the
extent that its category points are further apart. Proceeding clockwise, Vienna,
Female, Cognitive and Avoiding and Dependant are associated. Time unlimited and
In education are associated. Finally there seems also to be a relation between
Madrid, Male, Take-the-best, Emotional and Filler and Rational.
The MCA clearly indicates that the two cities are a major factor in explaining the
differences of outcomes. We therefore decided not to pool data from the two
experiments, but analyze them separately. All following analyses will thus be
performed separately for the two data sets.
Fig. 4 Multiple correspondence analysis
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4.4 Regression analysis
Given that the emotional and filler products were chosen so rarely, we decided not
to include them in the following analyses. In order to analyze our research
questions, we estimated four nested multinomial regression models for each
experiment. The first model (M1) contained only the control variables Gender and
Age. The second model (M2) added our treatment variable Time pressure. In the
third (M3) and fourth (M4) models, we added decision styles and their interaction
with the treatment variable, respectively. In all these regressions, the ‘‘cognitive’’
product was used as reference category, so regression coefficients indicate how
strongly each factor influences the switch from ‘‘cognitive’’ to the indicated other
product. Tables 4 and 5 show the regression results for the two experiments.
For both experiments, model M1 (and mostly also the subsequent models)
indicates that the ‘‘recognition’’ product is chosen significantly less often than
‘‘cognitive’’ (the reference category), but that age has a positive impact, although
small, on the choice of ‘‘recognition’’, i.e. older respondents tend to choose the
product with familiar package more frequently. Moving to model M2, we find a
significant treatment effect only in the Vienna experiments, where time pressure
causes a significant shift from ‘‘cognitive’’ to the ‘‘take-the-best’’ product. Thus, we
find only limited evidence for a positive answer of RQ1, the use of heuristics
increases with time pressure only in one of the two experiments.
The effects of decision styles are also very different between the two experiments.
There are no significant effects in the Madrid experiments at all in model M3 (which
looks at the average across treatment conditions). Adding the interaction terms in
modelM4 reveals that a high score in the rational decision style leads to a less frequent
choice of the ‘‘take-the-best’’ product (and thus amore frequent choice of ‘‘cognitive’’)
without time pressure, and this ordering is reversed under time pressure. This
corresponds to our expectations as formulated in RQ2. A reverse effect of time
pressure can be observed for subjects scoring high in the dependent style.
In contrast, in theViennaexperiments,wemainlyfind effects of decision styleswhich
are not influenced by time pressure. Surprisingly, subjects who score high on the
intuitive style are significantlymore likely to choose the ‘‘cognitive’’ product than either
of the other two products, and subjects who score high on the rational style choose the
‘‘take-the-best’’ product more often, rather than the ‘‘cognitive’’ product. More in line
with our expectations formulated inRQ4, we alsofind that subjectswho score high in the
spontaneous style are more likely to choose the ‘‘recognition’’ product instead of the
‘‘cognitive’’ one. In neither data set we find the relationships between avoidant and
dependent styles and the recognition product to which RQ3 refers.
Finally, to take into account the differences between choices of the ‘‘take-the-best’’
and ‘‘recognition’’ products, we also estimated multinomial regression models using
these products as reference categories. Figures 5 and 6 summarize the significant results
of all estimations. Please note that arrows in these figures do not represent influences
from one of the products to the other, but indicate that the factor indicated in the text on
each arrow causes a significant shift in choices from one product to another.
For the Vienna data, there are no significant effects causing a shift between
‘‘take-the-best’’ and ‘‘recognition’’ products. In the Madrid data, time pressure in
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general causes a shift from ‘‘take-the-best’’ to ‘‘recognition’’, which is partly offset
for subjects who score high on the rational style.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Our results have provided some evidence with respect to the research questions
formulated in Sect. 2, which we summarize below:
Table 4 Multinomial regression results—Madrid
M1 M2 M3 M4
Recognition -3.1390*** -3.4013*** –4.4565 -10.7695*
TakeBest -0.4142 -0.5472 –2.1716 -0.5302
Recognition:male 0.1990 0.1184 0.1705 0.3137
TakeBest:male -0.0006 -0.0384 0.1891 0.3068
Recognition:age 0.0669* 0.0632* 0.0639* 0.0667
TakeBest:age 0.0210 0.0189 0.0213 0.0205
Recognition:time pressure 0.8526 0.7391 12.1754
TakeBest:time pressure 0.4828 0.3790 -4.0669
Recognition:rational -0.0218 0.2254
TakeBest:rational -0.3090 -0.9119*
Recognition:intuitive 0.1382 0.5046
TakeBest:intuitive 0.3559 0.4713
Recognition:dependent 0.0541 0.3788
TakeBest:dependent 0.2049 0.5238
Recognition:avoiding -0.3076 0.0238
TakeBest:avoiding 0.0762 0.1291
Recognition:spontaneous 0.3770 0.4701
TakeBest:spontaneous 0.0682 -0.1252
Recognition:time pressure:rational -0.5879
TakeBest:time pressure:rational 1.1249
Recognition:time pressure:intuitive -0.5589
TakeBest:time pressure:intuitive 0.0109
Recognition:time pressure:dependent -0.5546
TakeBest:time pressure:dependent -0.7891
Recognition:time pressure:avoiding -0.6852
TakeBest:time pressure:avoiding -0.0081
Recognition:time pressure:spontaneous -0.2664
TakeBest:time pressure:spontaneous 0.5469
McFadden R2 0.024 0.034 0.073 0.132
Likelihood ratio 5.610 8.100 17.365 31.298
*** p\0:1%, ** p\1%, * p\5%,  p\10%
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RQ1 Impact of time pressure on heuristics: We find some evidence for an
increase in take the best in one experiment (Vienna), but not in the other
experiment (Madrid).
RQ2 Rational decision makers switch to take the best under time pressure: Weak
effect in the Madrid experiments, in the Vienna experiments, rational
decision makers tend to use take the best independent of time pressure.
RQ3 Positive relationship between avoidant/dependent styles and recognition: No
evidence.
Table 5 Multinomial regression—Vienna
M1 M2 M3 M4
Recognition -2.2544** -2.7231*** -3.5248 -6.3776
TakeBest -0.7580 -1.3210 -1.8657 -2.7020
Recognition:male -0.3963 -0.3333 -0.6289 -0.7594
TakeBest:male -0.2356 -0.1646 -0.5278 -0.6986
Recognition:age 0.0483* 0.0523* 0.0500 0.0501
TakeBest:age 0.0094 0.0149 0.0200 0.0188
Recognition:time pressure 0.7366 0.6910 5.8068
TakeBest:time pressure 0.8262* 0.8799* 1.7516
Recognition:rational 0.3391 0.5043
TakeBest:rational 0.5393 0.8639
Recognition:intuitive -0.6778* -0.9670
TakeBest:intuitive -0.8500** -1.2534**
Recognition:dependent -0.2027 0.1263
TakeBest:dependent -0.0608 0.2728
Recognition:avoiding 0.2202 0.1501
TakeBest:avoiding 0.0370 -0.3431
Recognition:spontaneous 0.6654* 1.1755*
TakeBest:spontaneous 0.4794 0.6453
Recognition:time pressure:rational -0.2977
TakeBest:time pressure:rational -0.4428
Recognition:time pressure:intuitive 0.4708
TakeBest:time pressure:intuitive 0.8789
Recognition:time pressure:dependent -0.6667
TakeBest:time pressure:dependent -0.6844
Recognition:time pressure:avoiding 0.2172
TakeBest:time pressure:avoiding 0.6702
Recognition:time pressure:spontaneous -0.8496
TakeBest:time pressure:spontaneous -0.4200
McFadden R2 0.017 0.035 0.101 0.139
Likelihood ratio 4.678 9.785 28.119* 38.887*
***p\0:1%, **p\1%, *p\5%,  p\10%
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RQ4 Positive relationship between spontaneous style and recognition: Significant
relationship in the Vienna experiment, no relationship in the Madrid
experiment.
Apart from these limited answers to our research questions, our empirical study has
led to some additional insights on the role of decision making styles and heuristics
in the cross-cultural context of the two experiments we performed. Although the
distribution of decision making styles is remarkably similar across the two
experiments, there are some differences in the factor structure of the instrument,
which seem to indicate that the questionnaire of Scott and Bruce (1995) might to
some extent be dependent on culture. In particular, the spontaneous style seems to
be less robust against cultural variations than the other dimensions. Not only the
factor analysis shown in Tables 1 and 2 shows slightly different assignments of the
items related to the spontaneous style to factors. The spontaneous style is also the
Fig. 5 Summary of regression results—Madrid
Fig. 6 Summary of regression results—Vienna
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only style for which a t-test reveals significant differences in scores between Vienna
and Madrid (at p\0:1%), for all the other styles differences are insignificant.
We also find even stronger differences in the choice patterns among the two
experiments. This seems to indicate that product choices in the two cultures could
be influenced by different factors in addition to decision making styles. Our data
indicates that subjects in Madrid on average purchase and consume eggs more
frequently than in Vienna. Although it might be possible to relate these differences
in consumption patterns to differences in the use of heuristics, both the direction of
the effect and causality remain ambiguous. On the one hand, use of more, or
different, heuristics could lead to different consumption patterns. On the other hand,
more frequent, and thus more routine purchases could influence the use of heuristics
in either direction: The decision could become more ‘‘automatic’’, with an increased
reliance on heuristics, or consumers could become more involved and use less
heuristics. The more frequent choice of the ‘‘take-the-best’’ product in Madrid could
be an indicator of more routinized purchase behavior.
Our results also allow us to draw some managerial implications for product
design and marketing. In both experiments, we find that time pressure leads to a
considerable decline in choosing the cognitively complex product. In an increas-
ingly hectic world, where consumers have less time for their product decisions,
avoiding cognitive complexity and making consumers’ choice as simple as possible
seems to be a necessity. As our results have shown, even consumers scoring high in
the rational dimension do not necessarily prefer the cognitively complex product.
Comparing choices of the take-the-best and recognition products, we can also
observe that familiarity is no guarantee for sales, but that providing consumers one
particular reason could be a good strategy (as long as this provides exactly the one
cue on which consumers focus in a take-the-best strategy).
Of course our study has several limitations. One of its major limitations is that we
were not able to observe decision processes directly, but can only infer them from the
products chosen. Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the cross-cultural
validity of the instrument by Scott and Bruce (1995) should be examined more
thoroughly, leading perhaps to culture-specific variants of the instrument. Our study
was also limited to one specific product category of low involvement daily choice
products. The impact of a rational decision style could be much stronger for more
important purchase decisions. While the relationship between products and underlying
decision strategies in our study is quite plausible, it also needs to be studied further and
more general methods are needed to identify whether a particular decision was indeed
made by using a specific heuristic. Such improved designs could help to obtain more
insights into the relationship of decision making styles and the use of heuristics.
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Appendix: Translated items from Scott and Bruce (1995)
Item German Spanish
R1 Ich plane wichtige Entscheidungen sorgfa¨ltig Planifico mis decisiones importantes con
cuidado
I1 Bei einer Entscheidungsfindung verlasse ich
mich auf meinem Instinkt
En la toma de deciciones me fı´o de mis
instintos
D1 Bei wichtigen Entscheidungen beno¨tige ich oft
Unterstu¨tzung von anderen Personen
Con frecuencia necesito la ayuda de otras
personas cuando tomo decisiones importantes
A1 Ich vermeide wichtige Entscheidungen zu
treffen, bis ein Druck zur
Entscheidungsfindung besteht
Evito tomar decisiones importantes hasta que
me siento presionado
S1 Generell treffe ich oft schnelle Entscheidungen Generalmente tomo decisiones sin pensarlo
mucho
R2 Ich kontrolliere Informationsquellen zweimal,
um sicher zu sein, dass ich fu¨r meine
Entscheidungen die richtigen Faktoren
beru¨cksichtige
Compruebo dos veces mis fuentes de
informacı´on para estar seguro de que tengo
los datos correctos antes de tomar una
decisı´on
I2 Wenn ich Entscheidungen treffe, verlasse ich
mich auf meine Intuition
Cuando tomo decisiones tiendo a fiarme de mi
intuicio´n
D2 Ich mache selten wichtige Entscheidungen
ohne andere Personen zu befragen
Raramente tomo decisiones importantes sin
consultar otras personas
A2 Wenn mo¨glich verschiebe ich Entscheidungen Pospongo tomar decisiones siempre que puedo
S2 Ich treffe meine Entscheidungen oft spontan Con frecuencia tomo decisiones sin pensarlo
R3 Ich treffe Entscheidungen auf eine logische und
systematische Art und Weise
Tomo decisiones de forma lo´gica y sistema´tica
I3 Generell treffe ich Entscheidungen, die sich
richtig anfu¨hlen
Normalmente tomo decisiones que siento que
son correctas
D3 Mit der Unterstu¨tzung anderer Menschen, fa¨llt
es mir leichter, Entscheidungen zu treffen
Si alguien me aconseja me resulta ma´s fa´cil
tomar decisiones importantes
A3 Ich schiebe oft wichtige Entscheidungen auf Con frecuencia retraso tomar decisiones
importantes
S3 Ich treffe schnelle Entscheidungen Tomo decisiones muy ra´pido
R4 Meine Entscheidungsfindung verlangt
sorgsames Nachdenken
Tomar una decisio´n requiere pensarlo bien
I4 Wenn ich Entscheidungen treffe, ist es fu¨r mich
wichtiger, dass sich die Entscheidungen
richtig anfu¨hlen, als dass ich einen rationalen
Grund dafu¨r habe
Cuando tomo una decisı´on es ma´s importante
para mı´ sentir que la decision es correcta que
tener una razon racional para ella
D4 Ich berufe mich auf den Rat anderer Menschen,
wenn ich wichtige Entscheidungen treffe
Me dejo aconsejar por otras personas a la hora
de tomar decisiones importantes
A4 Generell treffe ich wichtige Entscheidungen in
der letzten Minute
Normalmente tomo las decisiones importantes
en el u´ltimo momento
S4 Ich treffe Entscheidungen oft auf eine
gefu¨hlsbetone Art
Con frecuencia tomo decisiones impulsivas
R5 Wenn ich Entscheidungen treffe,
beru¨cksichtige ich verschiedene Optionen fu¨r
ein bestimmtes Ziel
Para tomar una decisio´n evalu´o varias opciones
segu´n un objetivo especı´fico
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Item German Spanish
I5 Wenn ich Entscheidungen treffe, vertraue ich
auf meine inneren Gefu¨hle und Reaktionen
Para tomar una decisio´n me fı´o de mis
sentimientos y reacciones personales
D5 Wenn ich wichtige Entscheidungen treffen
muss, mag ich es, etwas zu haben, das mich in
die richtige Richtung lenkt
Me gusta que alguien me dirija en la direccio´n
correcta cuando tomo decisiones importantes
A5 Ich schiebe viele Entscheidungen auf, weil
mich das Denken daru¨ber unruhig macht
Retraso tomar decisiones porque pensar sobre
ellas me incomoda/pone nervioso
S5 Wenn ich Entscheidungen treffe, tue ich das,
was mir natu¨rlich in diesem Moment
erscheint
Cuando tomo decisiones hago lo que me parece
natural en ese momento
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